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Abstract. We present a brief overview of the main challenges related
to data protection that need to be addressed when data are stored, pro-
cessed, or managed in the cloud. We also discuss emerging approaches
and directions to address such challenges.
Data security and privacy in the cloud
The ‘cloud’ has emerged as a successful paradigm enabling users and companies
to have access to a virtually unlimited amount of resources to store, manage, and
process data in a reliable and dependable infrastructure, even with economic ad-
vantages with respect to ‘in-house’ solutions. Together with considerable evident
convenience, the cloud also introduces novel security and privacy issues. In fact,
when storing or processing data in the cloud, data owners lose control over their
data, leaving them potentially exposed to unauthorized parties, including the
provider itself that might be not fully trusted. While typically cloud providers
may be considered reliable for guaranteeing basic security protection (such as
protection from unauthorized accesses to data and resources by third parties),
they might not be considered trusted for the confidentiality (i.e., authorized to
know the content) - or guaranteeing integrity - of the data they store or process.
Many are the challenges that need to be addressed to guarantee proper se-
curity and privacy in the cloud. In this paper, we focus in particular on the
challenges specifically related to data management [18,19,21,34,35]. Of course,
there are also other security and privacy issues that characterize a cloud scenario
(e.g., multi-tenancy and virtualization, fault-tolerance management [26,27,28])
on which we do not elaborate.
Protection of data at rest. Protection of data at rest concerns the security and
confidentiality of data in storage. Data stored at an external cloud provider
need to be protected from unauthorized accesses by third parties as well as
from the cloud provider itself, which might be not trusted for knowing the con-
tent of the data it stores or the accesses performed on them (honest-but-curios
provider). The protection of the confidentiality of stored data typically relies on
encryption. In cloud scenarios, protecting data from the providers’ eyes requires
keeping the encryption key within the client’s trust boundary. In other words,
encryption should work at the client side, encrypting data before moving them
to the cloud. Since encryption makes query evaluation and application execution
more expensive or not always possible (see next challenge on ‘fine-grained access
to outsourced data’), alternative fragmentation-based solutions have been also
proposed (e.g., [1,6,7,8,9,10]). Fragmentation allows departing from encryption
whenever what is sensitive are not the data values singularly taken but their
association (e.g., in a medical database, patients’ names and illnesses might be
considered public, while the specific association between the name of each patient
and her illness might be considered sensitive). In this case, instead of encrypt-
ing the values, the sensitive association can be protected by storing values that
are sensitive in association in di↵erent fragments so to break the association
itself impeding its visibility to non authorized parties. For instance, with ref-
erence to our example, the patients’ names can be stored in one fragment and
illnesses in another one. To ensure that the sensitive associations protected by
fragments cannot be reconstructed, fragments can be stored at independent (and
non communicating) providers, or fragments must be guaranteed to be unlink-
able. Fragmentation limits encryption to values that are sensitive by themselves,
or even completely departs from encryption in cases (e.g., hybrid cloud) where
the availability of a trusted party can be assumed for some storage/computation
support. The advantage of using fragmentation is the availability of data in
the clear, which enables evaluation of conditions on them and therefore better
support for query processing by the cloud provider. In addition to data confi-
dentiality, data integrity (i.e., authenticity and integrity of the stored data) and
availability (i.e., the satisfaction by cloud providers of the data storage and ac-
cess requirements that users may wish to enforce) are two further aspects that
need to be addressed [3,29].
Fine-grained access to outsourced data. As noted above, cloud providers can-
not have full access to the data they store, which might be either encrypted
or fragmented. Also, when data are encrypted, the encryption key should re-
main within the client’s trust boundary to ensure data remain confidential even
with respect to the storing and processing provider itself. Providers cannot then
decrypt data for query execution, making evaluation of conditions and query
support di cult (if at all possible). The problem of providing support for fine-
grained access (i.e., retrieval of data satisfying given conditions) over encrypted
data has been under the attention of the research and development community
in recent years and several investigations have been carried out. Among the ana-
lyzed techniques there are: cryptographic techniques supporting keyword-based
searches (e.g., [4]), homomorphic encryption (e.g., [22]), the use of di↵erent lay-
ers of encryption each supporting specific operations [33], and metadata (in-
dexes) attached to the data and used for fine-grained information retrieval and
execution of specific kinds of queries (e.g., [5,25,39]). The major di culty in
such investigations is the tradeo↵ existing between providing support for query
processing and ensuring that such support does not leak sensitive information
otherwise protected by encryption (or fragmentation).
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Selective data access. Data stored in the cloud may be subject to di↵erent ac-
cess control policies, meaning that di↵erent users might need to enjoy di↵erent
views on the outsourced data. Enforcing authorizations providing such selective
access in cloud environments results particularly challenging since, if on one side
clearly the data owner cannot provide such enforcement itself (as it would mean
intercepting every access to data), on the other side, the cloud provider may
not be fully trusted for such an enforcement. Also, the policy itself might be
sensitive or leak information on the data content. There are two main lines of
work investigating solutions for enforcing access control policies in the cloud.
The first line of work, under the generic umbrella of attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [24,41] is based on public key encryption and enforces authorizations by
ensuring that encryption depends on the values of certain attributes (which char-
acterize authorized users). This way, a user will be able to access data if her set
of attributes matches conditions on the attributes associated with the encrypted
data. ABE allows enforcement of authorizations that depend on di↵erent condi-
tions, thus providing expressive authorization support. The main limitation of
such approaches relate to the evaluation cost (given the use of public key en-
cryption) and to the di culty of enforcing revocation. The second line of work,
called selective encryption [12,13], is based instead on the use of symmetric
encryption and enforces authorizations by translating the authorization policy
into an equivalent encryption policy so that data can be encrypted with di↵erent
keys and keys are distributed to users in such a way that they can decrypt all
(completeness) and only (correctness) the data they are authorized to access. A
hierarchical organization of the encryption keys employed enables enforcing such
authorizations (providing di↵erent views over data) while ensuring both a single
copy of the data and the use of only one key per user. In fact, proper organiza-
tion of keys in a hierarchy, with tokens enabling key derivation allows users to
derive, from their own key all and only the keys enabling access to data they
are authorized to access. Selective encryption provides e cient access control,
as only symmetric encryption is used. Also, the use of public tokens enabling
key derivation allows their storage in the cloud itself. Changes to the access
policies (i.e., grant or revocation of authorizations) can be conveniently enforced
by over-encryption, by which the data owner can enforce changes to authoriza-
tions with the cooperation of the cloud provider, that - when demanded - can
wrap the data with a further level of encryption at the provider side (encrypting
resources already encrypted by the owner). Over-encryption enforces authoriza-
tion changes without the need for the data owner of retrieving, re-encrypting,
and re-uploading data already stored in the cloud.
Query privacy. In addition to data themselves, several scenarios may also re-
quire confidentiality guarantees on accesses made on data. A classical example
of these scenarios is a medical encyclopedia: while the encyclopedia itself is not
sensitive and neither might be (with respect to the storing provider) the identity
of users accessing it, the specific entries that a user looks for might be considered
confidential as they may disclose her (or of a person close to her) health con-
dition. Similar query confidentiality guarantees might also be requested when
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stored data are encrypted (as knowledge of the access might even compromise
the confidentiality of the stored data). The problem then arises of guaranteeing
access confidentiality, that is, the fact that a given access aims at given data,
as well as pattern confidentiality , that is, the fact that two accesses aim at the
same data. We call these new confidentiality guarantees query privacy as the
aim is to have them while also supporting e cient access to data for query sup-
port (e.g., index-search and evaluation of range conditions). Classical solutions
providing access privacy, such as private information retrieval proposals, o↵er
strong guarantees but limited access functionality and bear performance over-
head that make them not applicable in real-life scenarios. Among more recent
approaches, Path ORAM and the shu✏e index, provide better performance and
therefore applicability. Both these solutions are based on specific index struc-
tures and provide protection by either relying on a local stash, with dynamic
re-mapping and delayed writing (Path ORAM) [37] or by relying on caching,
cover searches, and shu✏ing with dynamic re-allocation of data at every access
(shu✏e index) [16,17]. Open issues are related to the need of decreasing the
performance overhead, providing more support for queries, and ensuring strong
confidentiality guarantees.
Integrity of query results. In addition to confidentiality, integrity of data can
also be put at risk when the involved provider(s) may not be fully trustwor-
thy. While for storage integrity classical techniques (e.g., chaining and signa-
ture) can be used, ensuring integrity of data dynamically retrieved, or result-
ing from computation, is challenging. Assessing integrity for query results or
computations entails providing users with the ability to verify that the result
returned by the cloud provider is complete (i.e., computed on the whole data
collection), correct (i.e., computed on genuine data and correctly performing
the computation), and fresh (i.e., computed on the most recent version of the
data). Approaches for guaranteeing integrity of query results can be classified
as deterministic (e.g., [30,31,32]) and probabilistic (e.g., [15,23,36,38,40,42]). De-
terministic solutions use authenticated data structures (e.g., signature chains,
Merkle hash trees, skip lists) or encryption-based solutions and can detect an
integrity violation only for queries formulated on the attribute(s) on which they
have been defined. Probabilistic solutions are based on the insertion of fictitious
information or checks in a dataset whose absence in a query result signals an
integrity violation. Probabilistic approaches can detect an integrity violation for
any query but only with probabilistic guarantees, meaning that they are sub-
ject to false negative results. The problem of assessing integrity of query results
becomes even more complex in emerging scenarios for distributed computation,
where di↵erent providers or workers may be involved (e.g., [11]).
Collaborative computation with selective sharing. In several scenario computa-
tion or query execution in the cloud might involve data under the control of
di↵erent authorities (data owners) and stored at di↵erent providers, which may
impose di↵erent access and sharing restrictions on their data. Some approaches
have addressed the problem of performing collaborative computations in contexts
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where no sharing is possible between the involved parties and only the query re-
sult can be known to them (e.g., secure multi-party computation or sovereign
joins [2]). These solutions are based on the use of encryption together with the
possible involvement of a trusted computing base. Other approaches have con-
sidered scenarios where data can be selectively shared with other parties and
di↵erent data owners and/or cloud providers need to collaborate, and selectively
share information with others, for query execution. The problem addressed is
then the distributed query execution (which necessarily entails exchange of data
among the involved parties) in such a way that data are made visible only to
authorized parties and no information is improperly shared or leaked [14,43].
In this context, ongoing work is investigating novel techniques for expressing
and enforcing sharing policies, regulating information flows in query execution,
and e ciently computing a query execution plan ensuring that no information
is improperly released or leaked. Other approaches address the orthogonal prob-
lem of protecting the objectives of queries from the providers involved in their
evaluation (e.g., [20]).
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